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In the present study we analyse the topic of coalition formation in multi-issue multilateral negotiations under different 
voting rules when there is the opportunity of logrolling. We have carried out 3 experiments and compare our findings 
with the standard public choice theory predictions. In the first experiment we have shown that in a situation of 3-issues 
and 3-parties negotiations with majority rule, most of the subjects behave in a satisficing, not in a optimizing, way. 
They are found to be subject to a “Zone of Agreement Bias” (ZAB) which induces them to form suboptimal coalitions 
and to choose Pareto-dominated agreements. Moreover, we find that the cycling problem predicted by public choice 
theory in most cases does not arise. In experiment 2 we have shown that the adoption of the unanimity, instead of the 
majority, rule reduced the suboptimizing effect of the ZAB, and produced a much higher rate of optimal agreements. 
Experiment 3 shows that the results obtained in experiments 1 and 2 hold even when the level of complexity of the 
negotiation problem increases. To this aim we considered a situation of four-issues and four-parties negotiations under 
both the majority and the unanimity rule. 
 
 





                                                           
* The authors thank the CEEL (Center of Experimental Economics Laboratory) at the University of Trento, Italy, for 
hospitality and support, and Luigi Mittone for helpful comments.   2
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyse multilateral negotiations that offer a potential for logrolling
2 
by means of laboratory experiments. Logrolling in negotiation research refers to one of the main 
techniques used in integrative negotiation. The latter is defined in opposition to distributive 
negotiation in that it emphasises the importance of joint problem solving. In particular we will 
analyse  how negotiators’ cognition affects the process of coalition formation and the level of 
efficiency of the agreements under different voting rules. The topic we are dealing with lies in the 
intersect of the disciplinary areas of negotiation research and public choice theory. Logrolling, 
indeed, has been treated in both areas, but with different approaches and methodologies, which in 
our opinion can be integrated. Negotiation research (see Section 2 below), on the one hand, is more 
empirically based, in that it makes a wider use of direct observation and of experimentation, and 
stresses the importance of taking into account negotiators’ cognitive processes. Most of the work, 
however, which has been done so far exclusively deals with bilateral negotiation. How coalition 
formation in multilateral negotiation situations under different voting rules works has been left open 
to question. Public choice research (see Section 3), on the other hand, treats the topic of multilateral 
negotiation, coalition formation, and voting rules, but is mainly of a purely theoretical nature and is 
built on the assumption of negotiators’ perfect rationality. Our objective is simultaneously to draw 
from and to integrate both perspectives and to provide experimental data on certain cognitive 
aspects that affect the process of coalition formation and the efficiency of the agreements in 
multilateral negotiations.  
 
 
2. Logrolling in negotiation research 
 
The focus of our analysis lies on integrative negotiations which are characterized by joint problem 
solving. One of the main instruments used in the analysis of integrative negotiations is the 
technique of logrolling. “Many negotiations provide opportunities for integrative agreements in 
which the parties maximise their outcomes, or achieve greater resources, without competing with 
the other party in a direct win-lose fashion [as it happens in distributive negotiations]” (Thompson 
and Hastie, 1990a). Integrative analysis, rather than seeing a process that works from fixed points of 
                                       
2 The word logrolling is metaphorically employed in the economic literature to indicate a reciprocal exchange of favors. 
It has assumed  this meaning because of the habit in use among the woodcutters  to help each other  when they have to 
transport logs. The rolling of a log indeed requires the cooperation of at least two people.    3
discord to a common point of convergence, stresses the need to create new solutions by 
manipulating the involved subjects’ conceptualizations of the problem through a process of 
inventive and cooperative problem solving, so as to reconcile the interests of all parties and reach 
joint benefits, or attain “win-win” goals (Pruitt, 1986; Putnam, 1990; Brett et al., 1990; Fisher and 
Ury, 1991; Brett, 2000). The different parties are likely to have different interests, priorities, and 
resources, and these asymmetries frequently produce cross-cutting cleavages among actors and 
opportunities for tradeoffs among issues which could be positively exploited. Simple concession-
convergence bargaining becomes virtually impossible since there is no single dimension along 
which parties can converge.  
A growing branch of integrative analysis focuses on precise mechanisms for identifying the best 
tradeoffs among the parties’ interests, and thereby insuring optimality to the outcome (Zartman, 
1999). To be sure, this doesn’t mean that the distributive component of bargaining is completely 
eliminated from the negotiation process, but simply that the parties “can cooperate in order to 
change the pie that they eventually will have to divide” (Raiffa, 1982). 
In contrast the technique of logrolling consists in redefining the issues by aggregating them into 
interlocking issues. Sub-issues are linked together “to create package agreements out of components 
that would be nonnegotiable if treated separately” (Hopmann, 1996). This approach involves 
identifying and prioritising interests, and creating tradeoffs in which parties concede on low-priority 
interests in order to receive satisfaction of high-priority interests (Brett et al., 1990). 
The idea of logrolling is represented in Fig.2.1. On both issues the bargaining spaces of the parties 
don’t overlap, since the preference curves intersect below the line of neutrality or indifference. In a 
situation of distributive bargaining this would create a stalemate on both issues. However, if we 
consider that party 1 has stronger interests about issue 2 and is more neutral on issue 1, and party 2 
has stronger interest on issue 1 and is more neutral on issue 2, a solution can be found by agreeing 
to let party 1 win on issue 2, and party 2 win on issue 1. If party 1’s gains on issue 2 exceed its 
losses on issue 1, and party 2’s gains on issue 1 exceed its losses on issue 2, then both parties will 
still find the overall agreement beneficial (for a more precise description of the solutions to this 
negotiation problem see Fig. 2.4) 
Note that in order for logrolling to take place, and thus to achieve Pareto-optimal outcomes, the 
parties should possess the cognitive capabilities required to represent and analyse the whole space 
of the negotiation problem. From the traditional point of view of rational-choice theory, which 
underlies most economic models, the problem of understanding the complexity of a problem would 
not exist since the parties are considered to be able to construct complete and objective 
representations of reality. In the rational-choice approach the agents are assumed to possess perfect   4
knowledge of the whole set of alternatives available to achieve their goals, and of the consequences 
that would flow from each of them. Furthermore, they are assumed to have a well defined and 
stable structure of preferences over alternatives, to be driven by the maximisation motive, to be 
endowed with unlimited computational ability, and to choose the tactics most likely to produce an 
optimal realisation of their goals. Under these assumptions the parties would always be able to 
recognise and take mutually advantage of the integrative potential of negotiations. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Issue aggregation – 










Party 1   ------- 
     P a r t y   2  
 
The utility curves of party 1 and 2 intersect below the horizontal line of indifference, thus the two parties don’t have a 
Zone of Agreement on neither issue. By aggregating the two issues (party 1 wins on issue 2 and party 2 wins on issue 
1), however, the two parties can both reach a beneficial agreement (for a more precise description of the solutions to 
this negotiation problem see Fig. 2.4) 
 
 
A large amount of empirical research (see for example Simon, 1982; Ho and Weigelt, 1996; 
Schotter et al., 1994; Selten, 1997; Legrenzi and Girotto, 1996; Zhang and Norman, 1994; Johnson-
Laird, 1990; Ripps, 1994; Evans and Over, 1996; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986;), nevertheless, has 
demonstrated that individuals don’t actually behave in such a perfectly rational way. When a 
complex problem situation arises, individuals are not able, because of their limited computational 
abilities, to develop an objective and complete representation of the problem; rather, they construct 
a subjective, simplified, partial, and sometimes even idiosyncratic, mental model of the situation, 
and then use this mental model to make projections and predictions about the future. As problem 
representations are generally prior to the generation of solutions, poor decision making and biases 
0 0 
U  U U  U   5
may not derive from the way preferences and alternatives are handled, but rather from the 
assumptions that underlie the generation, evaluation, revision, and selection among those 
preferences and alternatives. 
Research on negotiation has begun to focus attention on the study of how negotiators define and 
perceive a negotiation game. (Bazerman, 1983 and 1985; Hammond et al., 1975; Carroll and Payne, 
1991; Thompson and Hastie, 1990 b). Experimental evidence has demonstrated that negotiators use 
various presumptions or simplifying strategies to interpret the situation and to construct a response. 
As will be explained in more detail in the following, the more complex and ill-structured is the 
negotiation problem, the more biased is the negotiators’ representations.  
Bazerman (1983) suggested that negotiators’ mental models are subjected to the “fixed-pie bias”. 
They perceive negotiation as a purely distributive, or competitive, game in which there is a fixed pie 
of resources to be divided up among the parties, and better outcomes for one party can be obtained 
only at the expenses of another party. Bazerman (1985) found that in a negotiation task with 
integrative potential individuals concentrate first on competitive issues and it takes them significant 
experience to overcome the fixed pie bias and recognize the integrative potential of the situation. 
Hammond et al. (1975) suggest that negotiators frequently have poor and inaccurate perceptions of 
their opponents’ importance weights for multi-issue conflicts. “The fixed pie assumption actually 
may derive from the presumption that the other party has the same concerns regarding the relative 
importance of the issues, thus eliminating the possibility for mutually-beneficial trades” (Carroll 
and Payne, 1991). This presumption is due to a social perception bias known as “false consensus 
effect”. It refers to the tendency of people to overestimate the proportion of other people who have 
interests similar to their own (Ross et al., 1977), and in negotiation this might result in distributive, 
win-lose perceptions of the task (Thompson and Hastie, 1990 b).  
Reina (2003) has shown that, besides the fixed pie bias, there exists an additional factor which 
explains the suboptimality observed in integrative negotiation. This factor is represented by a “Zone 
of Agreement bias” (ZAB) which is due to the fact that negotiators behave in a satisficing, and not 
optimizing, way. In other words, negotiators explore only a limited part of the negotiation 
problem’s space, and, as soon as they are able to find a suboptimal agreement, they stop searching 
for the optimal solution and remain blocked in the suboptimal one. Reina compared negotiators’ 
behavior under two different treatments (A and B). Treatment A is the one described in Fig.2.2, in 
which the bargaining spaces of the two negotiators don’t overlap in neither issue. Treatment B is the 
one described in Fig.2.3, in which the bargaining spaces of the two negotiators overlap in both 
issues. In Fig. 2.4 and 2.5 are represented the spaces of all possible couples of agreements on issues   6
Figure 2.2 – Treatment A – 










Party 1    ------- 
     P a r t y   2  
The abscissas of the two graphs represent the values of issue 1 and 2 respectively. The two parties don’t have a 
Zone of Agreement on neither issue. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Treatment B – 










Party 1 --------- 
     P a r t y   2  
 
The abscissas of the two graphs represent the values of issue 1 and 2 respectively. The two parties have a Zone of 
Agreement (the bold line) on both issues.  
0 0 
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Here is represented the space of all possible couples of agreements on issues 1 and 2 under treatment A. The region X 
contains all the possible agreements in which both players obtain a positive total payoff through logrolling, and the bold 





















Here is represented the space of all possible agreements on issues one and two under treatment B. The region Z contains 
those agreements in which both players obtain a positive payoff on each issue singularly. Any agreement in the area Y 
Pareto dominates any other agreement inside Z.   8
1 and 2 respectively under treatment A and B. Along the line I1 in Fig. 2.4 we can find all the joint 
agreements inducing a total payoff of zero for player one; the arrow indicates the hemiplane 
containing agreements with a total payoff greater than zero. Similarly along I2  we can find all the 
joint agreements inducing a total payoff of zero for player two; the arrow indicates the hemiplane 
containing agreements with a total payoff greater than zero. The region X contains all the possible 
agreements in which both players obtain a positive total payoff, and the bold line represents the 
Pareto frontier of such region. As we already know, under treatment A there are no joint agreements  
in which both players obtain a positive payoff on both issues. Region X represents then the 
bargaining space which emerges when the two issues are aggregated (through the logrolling 
mechanism).  
In Fig. 2.5 lines and arrows have the same meaning as in figure 2.4 but now we can also observe a 
new region (the box denoted by Z) which is delimited by the two Zones of Agreement of the two 
issues (the bold lines in Fig.2.3), and contains those agreements in which both players obtain a 
positive payoff on each issue singularly (and of course a positive total payoff). It is worth noting 
that any agreement in the area Y Pareto dominates any other agreement inside Z. 
The rate of suboptimal agreements has been higher when negotiators had a Zone of Agreement 
(treatment B). In this case indeed, the possibility to find an agreement on the two issues separately, 
prevented negotiators from exploring the space of more efficient agreements achievable through the 
aggregation of the two issues. Negotiators remained blocked in the suboptimal agreements falling 
within the Zone of Agreement of each issue, and didn’t consider the Pareto optimal ones falling 
outside of it. Negotiators under treatment A, in contrast, not being able to find a suboptimal 




3. Logrolling in the public choice approach 
 
In the public choice literature logrolling refers to the exchange of votes within decision making 
committees and in particular within legislatures. A logrolling situation is normally defined in the 
following way (Stratman, 1997): 
 
let (x,y) and (z,w) be pairs of mutually exclusive issues. If voters preferences in relation to each pair 
are separable and each voter votes sincerely, a logrolling situation exists if 
   9
xPy and zPw, but ywPxz, 
 
where P represents the social preference as determined by the voting rule employed. In a pairwise 
vote x defeats y and z defeats w. But, if all issues are voted contemporaneously, the pair yw can 
defeat, through a vote-trading agreement (logrolling), the pair xz. 
Stratmann illustrates logrolling with the example reported in Table 3.1.  
 
 
Tab. 3.1 – Example of logrolling 
 
  Issues 
Voters  A B 
1  5 -1 
2  -1 5 
3  -1 -1 
 
 
In this example voters 1, 2, and 3 vote separately with majority rule for the passage of each issue A 
and B. The numbers in the cells represent the payoff of each voter for the passage of each issue. The 
table represents the payoffs for each voter on each issue. If everyone voted sincerely (i.e. stated 
honestly his preference - pass or not pass - for each single issue), neither issue A nor issue B would 
pass. However voters 1 and 2 have an incentive to make an agreement in which voter 1 accepts to 
vote for B in exchange for voter 2 voting for A. In the presence of this votes-trade, which implies a 
misrepresentation of preferences, both issues pass. In this particular example, the total utility is 
increased by 3 units for each issue, and society is better off overall. 
Early studies by political scientists often report vote trading in their descriptions of legislative 
behavior. Mayhew (1966) has studied the House of Representatives in the United States from 1948 
to 1962. He considered votes concerning farm, city, labor, and western issues. In that period of 
time, most representatives from the Democratic party showed a tendency to vote in ways benefiting 
special interests. Examining the constituency benefiting from various types of legislation, Mayhew 
argued that legislation benefiting farm, labor, and western interests could not have passed if every 
legislator had voted sincerely. Mayhew observed that Democrats representing various special 
interests supported each other on four different types of issue. Stratmann (1992) identifies logrolling 
statistically among agricultural interests on amendments to the 1985 farm bill. Among the findings   10
are that representatives from tobacco districts traded votes with legislators representing other 
agricultural commodity interests, specifically sugar and peanut farmers. Further evidence of 
logrolling taking place within legislatures is provided by Froman (1967), Jackson (1974), Kau and 
Rubin (1979), Stratmann (1995). 
In the example reported in Table 3.1 we saw that through logrolling the society is better off overall. 
Nevertheless, we have to note that, by replacing the –1’s by –3’s, there is still an incentive for 
voters 1 and 2 to trade votes, but in this case society is worse off overall by –1 for each issue. 
Logrolling indeed, can produce externalities with utility losses on nontraders, and, depending on the 
entity of these losses, the community as a whole can be better or worse off. In the first case 
logrolling can be interpreted as a positive sum game; in the second as a negative sum game. The 
fact that vote-trading can be on net welfare enhancing as well as welfare reducing, has raised a 
controversy surrounding the optimality of logrolling. Early discussions on the topic go back at least 
to Bentley (1907), and the whole century has seen authors and arguments in favour of as well as 
against logrolling (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Coleman, 1966a,b; Mueller, 1967 and 1973; 
Wilson, 1969; Koford, 1982). 
One of the arguments against logrolling is related to the problem of cyclical majorities. The public 
choice literature (Mueller, 1989) has shown that some of the negative impacts of vote-trading stem 
from the possibility to form potentially unstable coalitions and majorities. Using the example in 
Table 3.1 it is possible to illustrate how logrolling is linked to cyclical majorities. In Table 3.1 there 
exist four possible combinations of issue pairs: (A,B), (-A,B), (A,-B), (-A,-B), where –A and –B 
means that issue A and B respectively do not pass. Let’s suppose that voters 1 and 2 make an 
agreement to let the issue pair (A,B) pass. Now voter 3 has an incentive to propose an agreement to 
voter 1 for the passage of the issue pair (A,-B). This combination makes both voters 1 and 3 better 
off. At this point voter 2 has an incentive to propose an agreement to voter 3 in order to let none of 
the issues pass (-A,-B). From here the cycle starts all over again with the issue pair (A,B).  
Bernholz (1973) has demonstrated first that the existence of a logrolling situation implies 
intransitive social preferences, and second that the existence of a transitive social preference 
ordering implies the absence of a logrolling situation. The only situation in which logrolling is 
certain not to create the potential for a cycle is when a unanimity rule is employed. The possibility 
of cycling through logrolling indeed may have severe implications for the stability of the political 
system. If coalitions are inherently unstable the outcome of the political process might indeed be 
suboptimal. 
 
   11
4. Integrating the negotiation and public choice perspectives: an 
experimental study on multilateral integrative negotiation 
 
As noted earlier, most of the public choice research on logrolling and coalition formation is of a 
purely theoretical nature and particularly is based on the assumption that individuals behave in a 
perfectly rational way. That means that even in very complex situations they are always able to 
recognise the optimal voting strategy and to form the best coalition which allows them to maximize 
their gains. Nevertheless, empirical research on negotiation has demonstrated that the perfect 
rationality assumption is often violated by individuals. As we mentioned in Section 2 Reina (2003) 
has shown that in a situation of two-issue bilateral bargaining with a potential for logrolling 
negotiators are often subjected to a “Zone of Agreement bias” (ZAB), i.e. they reach suboptimal 
agreements because they remain locked in their Zone of Agreement without exploring the Pareto-
dominant solutions falling outside of it.  
In the present study we will address the problem of logrolling and of the ZAB in a situation of 
multi-issue multilateral bargaining. We want to analyse to what extent negotiators are actually able 
to form an optimal coalition and reach an optimal agreement in a situation of three-issue and three-
parties negotiation with a potential for logrolling. Our focus will be on testing the hypothesis that in 
certain situations the ZAB might induce negotiators to form suboptimal coalitions which lead to 
Pareto-dominated agreements, and that the cycling problem predicted by the public choice theory 
might not exist (experiment 1). Moreover we will analyse the effects produced by voting rules 
(majority or unanimity) (experiment 2) and by the degree of complexity of the negotiation problem 
on the ZAB and on the level of optimality of agreements (experiment 3).  
Consider the situation described in Fig. 4.1.1. Three negotiators, A, B, and C have to negotiate on 
three issues 1, 2, and 3 and to make decisions employing a simple majority rule. In each graph the 
horizontal axis represents the value of the issue to be negotiated and the vertical axis represents the 
utility values of the involved negotiators. The three curves represent the utility functions of the three 
negotiators. The curves have been constructed so that on issue 1 (2, 3) negotiators A and B (C and 
A, B and C, respectively) share a Zone of Agreement, and negotiator C (B, A), which has the 
highest interest on issue 1 (2, 3), doesn’t share any Zone of Agreement with the other two 
negotiators. In this situation there are three types of possible solutions to the negotiation problem:  
 
1) Non-integrative suboptimal solution: if the three issues were negotiated separately, negotiators 
A and B would form a coalition and find an agreement within their Zone of Agreement on issue 
1, and the same would happen for negotiators A and C on issue 2, and for B an C on issue 3.   12
This way each negotiator would win on his two low-priority issues and lose on his high priority 
issue (if the players choose this solution and make an equitable agreement in this particular 
example, each of them wins about 9 points). There is also the possibility that the negotiators 
don’t find any agreement on one or more issues; in this case the negotiators get 0 points for each 
issue on which they disagree, and the solution would be non-integrative and suboptimal as well. 
 
2) Integrative Pareto optimal solution: the negotiation of the three issues together could lead 
negotiators to a Pareto-dominant (in comparison to solution 1) outcome. The three parties indeed 
have different interest intensities on the three issues, and they could engage in a logroll in which 
each party accepts to lose on his two low-priority issues in exchange for a win on his high-
priority issue (in our example, the parties might decide to let C win on issue 1, B on issue 2, and 
A on issue 3). The utility curves have been constructed in such a way that, if the negotiators 
choose this solution and make an equitable agreement, the payoff for each negotiator would be 
between three and four times greater than with solution 1 (i.e. 32 points). 
 
3) Integrative individually optimal solution: two negotiators could form a coalition and exclude 
the third negotiator. The two members of the coalition could make an integrative agreement in 
which each one wins on his own high priority issue and on the high priority issue of the third 
negotiator (if the two coalition members make an equitable agreement, they get about 51 points 
each while the excluded negotiator loses about 34 points). This solution would be optimal for the 
two coalition members, but surely would not be Pareto-optimal. This solution, moreover, would 
imply a cycling problem because all coalitions A-B, B-C, and C-A would be equally likely. 
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Fig. 4.1.1  
3 issues and 3 parties 
logrolling 
 
On each issue  two 
negotiators out of three 
share a zone of 
agreement (the bold line 
on the abscissa), and the 
third negotiator excluded 
from the zone of 
agreement is the one with 
the highest interest on the 
issue. 
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5. Experiment 1 
 
The aim of this experiment is to test the hypothesis that first in a situation like the one described in 
Fig. 4.1.1 the negotiators might form, because of the ZAB, suboptimal coalitions that lead to 
Pareto-dominated agreements, and that second no cycle might arise. The existence of a Zone of 
Agreement for two parties on each issue might induce negotiators to behave in a satisficing, and not 
optimizing, way; i.e. negotiators look for a solution within the Zone of Agreement, and as soon as 
they find it they stop their search for a better agreement, and do not explore the space of Pareto-
dominant solutions falling outside the Zone of Agreement. This way the parties would choose the 
non-integrative suboptimal solution (solution 1, see the Section 4): they would negotiate on each 
issue separately and form suboptimal winning coalitions (A and B on issue1, A and C on issue 2, B 
and C on issue 3). In this case no cycle should be observed. 
 
 
5.1 Experimental design 
 
The experiment has been run with 39 undergraduate students from the Faculty of Economics of the 
University of Trento, Italy. Subjects were asked to take part in an experiment aimed at analysing 
negotiation behavior. They were randomly divided in groups of three. Each group was asked to 
negotiate on three different issues. Each subject was given a sheet with three Tables (for the Tables 
see Appendix B) representing her incentive in the negotiation about the three issues respectively. 
The first column of each Table contained numbers from 0 to 28, representing the possible 
agreements on an issue, and the second column contained the points associated to each agreement 
(the values in the Tables corresponded to the utility functions of Fig. 4.1.1, with the only difference 
that the abscissa values of the second issue have been inverted, i.e. from 28 to 0, instead from 0 to 
28; this was done in order to prevent the subjects from realizing that they had the same utility 
functions on the three issues respectively). Subjects were requested to negotiate with their 
counterpart on one number from 0 to 28 in the first Table, one number in the second Table, and one 
in the third Table in such a way to maximise their own total number of points (for the precise 
instructions see Appendix A). The decision on each issue was to be taken with a majority rule of 
two out of three. Each player, including the one excluded from the winning coalition, was assigned 
the points corresponding to the number chosen by the coalition members.   15
Negotiation was carried out face to face and subjects were allowed to speak freely
3. The only 
restriction was that they could not show their sheet with the tables to their counterparts. They had a 
maximum of 15 minutes to reach an agreement on the three numbers. If they didn’t find an 
agreement on one of the three numbers they got 0 points for that number.  
As an incentive the subjects were paid a show-up fee (3 €) plus an amount of money dependent on 
their performance in the experiment, i.e. directly proportional to the number of points they obtained 
(0,25 € for each point). At the beginning subjects were automatically assigned 15 points. 
 
 
5.2 Theoretical predictions 
 
According to public choice theory and to the assumption of perfect rationality of individuals, the 
prediction for this experiment is that negotiators will choose solution 3 (see Section 4), i.e. two 
negotiators will form a coalition so that each coalition member wins on his own high-priority issue 
and on the high priority issue of the third negotiator who gets excluded from the coalition (i.e. each 
group should choose the number 28 on two issues, and a number within the interval 1-14, which 
corresponds to the Zone of Agreement, on the third issue). Since all coalitions A-B, A-C, and B-C 
are equally likely a cycling problem should arise. 
If negotiators are perfectly rational but also have a concern for equity, the theoretical prediction is 
that they will choose the Pareto-optimal solution (solution 2), i.e. they will form an extended 
coalition of three, in which each negotiator wins only on his own high-priority issue (i.e. each group 
should choose the number 28 on each issue). In this case no cycling problem arises.  
In contrast, our theoretical prediction, based on the assumption of bounded rationality of 
individuals, is that the ZAB will induce part of the negotiators to choose solution 1, even though it 
is Pareto-dominated by solution 2. Negotiators A and B, B and C, and A and C in this case would 
form a coalition on issue 1, 2, and 3, respectively (i. e. each agreement would fall within the interval 
1-14), and no cycle should be observed. 
 
 
                                       
3 In some experiments the fact that the players interact face to face and are allowed to speak freely with one another 
might influence the results in that it introduces a problem of fairness (the topic of fairness in bargaining games is a very 
vast one and would require a whole paper in order to be treated in an exhausting way. Since this was not our main 
objective, we remand the reader to Kagel and Roth (1995) where a very nice and complete review can be found of 
experimental research on fairness in bargaining games).  However we think that in our experiment this was not the case 
because an eventual concern of the players for fairness could cause, at most, a shift of choices from solution 3 to 
solution 2 (which are both optimal), but not from solution 2 or 3 to solution 1.     16
5.3 Results 
 
In Table 5.4.1 and Fig.5.4.1 the results of the experiment are represented. The agreements on the 
second issue are reported in terms of the original scale, i.e. from 0 to 28.  
Groups 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 (69%) have made agreements on the three issues, which fall 
within the Zone of Agreement, i.e. the interval 1-14 (solution 1). 
Groups 2, 5, 11 (23%) have made agreements on the three issues outside the Zone of Agreement, in 
particular at point 28 (solution 2).  
Group 3 (8%) has made an agreement at point 28 on two issues, and at point 5 on one issue 





Tab 5.4.1 – Results experiment 1 
 









1  4 3 2 
2  28 0 28 
3  5 0  28 
4  5 5 5 
5  28 0 28 
6  1 3 4 
7  5 5 5 
8  3 4 8 
9  7 3 5 
10  4 4 2 
11  28 0 28 
12  5 4 5 
13  2 2 3   17
 
 Fig.  5.4.1 
 
The diagram represents all the agreements (the black points) that the groups made on the three issues. Each group is 
identified by a number which appears on the side of each agreement point. For each group three agreements on the three 
issues are depicted respectively. The bold line from 1 to 14 on the abscissa represents the Zone of Agreement of the 





The results of the experiment have confirmed our initial hypothesis in that a great majority of the 
subjects (69%) behaved in a way which is inconsistent with the public choice predictions, but 
consistent with the ZAB prediction. 69% of the subjects indeed, adopted a satisficing behaviour; as 
soon as two negotiators out of three were able to find a suboptimal agreement within their Zone of 
Agreement on each issue separately (solution 1), the search process for an optimal solution (outside 
the Zone of Agreement) was interrupted. Only 31% of the subjects have been able to find an 
Results exp. 1
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optimal agreement (23 % chose solution 2, and 8 % solution 3) by exploring the space of solutions 
falling outside the Zone of Agreement
4.  
Moreover, for all the groups (92%) who chose solution 1 and 2 there arose no cycling problem; in 
the case of solution 1, on each issue a stable coalition agreement was made between the two 
subjects who shared a Zone of Agreement. In the case of solution 2, a stable coalition agreement of 
all three group members was made. 
 
 
6. Experiment 2  
 
The aim of experiment 2 is to examine the effect that different voting rules can have on the ZAB 
and on the optimality of the agreements. We consider the same negotiation problem of experiment 1 
and observe what happens when a unanimity rule, instead of a majority rule, is employed. Our 
hypothesis is that, in a situation like the one described in Fig. 4.1.1, the adoption of a unanimity rule 
instead of a majority rule might eliminate the effect of the ZAB “trap”. With a unanimity rule, 
indeed, the parties don’t have the possibility to negotiate the three issues separately, because on 
each issue there would be the veto of at least one party. This way negotiators might be induced to 
explore the space of solutions falling outside the Zone of Agreement, and eventually to find an 
optimal agreement. 
It is worth noting that, under unanimity rule, solution 1 is an integrative solution, because each 
negotiator must accept to lose on one issue in order to win on the remaining two. Nevertheless it 
remains a suboptimal solution (it is Pareto-dominated by solution 2) because each negotiator loses 
on his high-priority issue and wins on his two low-priority issues. Under unanimity rule the only 
case of non-integrative suboptimal solution is that in which the negotiators try to negotiate on each 
issue separately, and don’t come to any agreement because on each issue there’s the veto of one 
player. Solution 2, moreover is the only (Pareto) optimal solution, because solution 3 is not viable 
under unanimity rule. 
 
 
                                       
4 It could be argued that most subjects found a suboptimal agreement within their Zone of Agreement because they have 
been subject to a sort of median position salience bias (the zone of agreement occupied a central position in the values’ 
interval of each issue) and not to the ZAB. We think, nevertheless that this was not the case: the most salient values of 
each player (were she could win the maximum number of points) were located at the extremes of the values’ scale for 2 
issues out of 3; it was only through the negotiation process that players were induced by their counterparts to take into 
consideration the values within the Zone of Agreement.      19
6.1 Experimental design 
 
The experiment has been carried out with 21 undergraduate students of the Faculty of Economics of 
the University of Trento. The design was exactly the same as in experiment 1, with the exception 
that decisions had to be made with the unanimity, instead of majority, rule. 
 
 
6.2 Theoretical predictions 
 
Our theoretical prediction is that, in comparison to experiment 1 where a majority rule was 
employed, under unanimity rule the effect of the ZAB should be reduced, and a greater number of 





The results of the experiment have been represented in Tab.6.4.1 and Fig.6.4.1. 
Groups 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 (72%) have made agreements on the three issues outside the Zone of 
Agreement, in particular at point 28 (solution 2).  
Group 2 (14%) has made agreements on the three issues, which fall within the Zone of Agreement, 
i.e. within the interval 1-14 (solution 1). 
Group 3 (14%) didn’t find any agreement at all. 
 
 
Tab 6.4.1 – Results experiment 2 
 









1  28 28 28 
2  3 3 3 
3  / / / 
4  28 28 28 
5  28 28 28 
6  28 28 28 
7  28 28 28   20
 Fig.  6.4.1 
 
The diagram represents all the agreements (the black points) that the groups made on the three issues. Each group is 
identified by a number which appears on the side of each agreement point. For each group three agreements on the three 
issues are depicted, respectively. The bold line from 1 to 14 on the abscissa represents the Zone of Agreement of the 




The results of experiment 2 have confirmed our initial hypothesis; under unanimity rule the effect 
of the ZAB has been considerably lower. The subjects have been induced to explore the space of 
solutions falling outside the Zone of Agreement, and 72% of them (in contrast to only 31% under 
majority rule) has been able to find the optimal solution in correspondence of the number 28. Only 
28% of the subjects (69% under majority rule) found a suboptimal solution (14%) or didn’t find any 
solution at all (14%).  
Results exp. 2
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For a synthesis of the results of experiments 1 and 2, and a comparison between the effects of the 
majority and the unanimity rule, see Fig.6.5.1. 
   
Fig. 6.5.1 
 
The (Pareto) optimal solution refers to both solutions 2 and 3, while the suboptimal solution refers to solution 1. 
 
7. Experiment 3 
 
In the previous experiment we have shown that the unanimity rule, in comparison to the majority 
rule, induced a larger number of negotiators to find (Pareto) optimal agreements. It is interesting 
now to test whether these results are dependent on the number of parties and issues involved in the 
negotiation increases, or not. An increase in the number of parties and issues, indeed, could result in 
a higher level of complexity of the negotiation problem and therefore, under the unanimity rule, the 
negotiators might not be able to find any agreement at all. In this case therefore a majority rule, 
even if yielding suboptimal agreements, would be preferable.  
Let’s consider the situation depicted in Fig. 7.1.1. Here we have four parties that have to negotiate 
on four issues. Each party has one high-priority issue and three low-priority issues. On each issue  
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Fig. 7.1.1 -  
4 issues and 4 parties 
logrolling 
 
On each issue three out 
of four negotiators 
share a zone of 
agreement (the bold 
line on the abscissa), 
and the fourth 
negotiator excluded 
from the zone of 
agreement is the one 
with the highest interest 
on the issue. 
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The negotiator excluded from the Zone of Agreement is always the one with the highest interest on 
that issue. The utility curves have been constructed in such a way that the solutions to this 
negotiation problem under the majority and the unanimity rule, respectively, are conceptually the 
same as in experiments 1 and 2. 
 
7.1 Experimental design 
 
The experiment has been carried out with 48 undergraduate students of the Faculty of Economics of 
the University of Trento. 24 subjects were assigned to the treatment with the majority rule, and 24 
to the treatment with the unanimity rule. In each treatment subjects were randomly divided in 
groups of four and asked to negotiate on four issues. The experimental design was exactly the same 
as for experiments 1 and 2, with the only difference that the values in the tables corresponded to the 
utility functions of Fig. 7.1.1 (the abscissa values of the second and fourth issues have been 
inverted, i.e. from 28 to 0 instead of 0 to 28) and that, under majority rule, decisions had to be taken 




Under the treatment with majority rule (see Table 7.3.1 and Fig. 7.3.1), groups 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 (83%) 
have made agreements on the four issues, which fall within the Zone of Agreement, i.e. within the 
interval 4-18 (solution 1). 
Only group 5 (17%) has made agreements on the four issues outside the Zone of Agreement, in 
particular at point 28 (solution 2).  
 
Tab. 7.3.1 – Results experiment 3 with majority rule 












1  8 7 9  10 
2  6 10  10 7 
3  8 16  11 7 
4  7 11 7  9 
5  28 28 28 28 
6  15 10 14 10 
   24
 Fig  7.3.1 
 
The diagram represents all the agreements (the black points) that the groups made on the four issues. Each group is 
identified by a number which appears on the side of each agreement point. For each group four agreements on the four 
issues are depicted, respectively. The bold line from 4 to 18 on the abscissa represents the Zone of Agreement of the 
four issues.  
 
 
Under the treatment with unanimity rule (see Table 7.3.2 and Fig. 7.3.2), all groups (100%) have 
made agreements on the four issues outside the Zone of Agreement, in particular at point 28 
(solution 2). 
Results exp. 3 - Majority rule
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Values of issues 1, 2, 3, 4
1 1 1 1
2 2 2
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Tab. 7.3.2 - Results experiment 3 with unanimity rule 
 












1  28 28 28 28 
2  28 28 28 28 
3  28 28 28 28 
4  28 28 28 28 
5  28 28 28 28 
6  28 28 28 28 
 
 
 Fig.  7.3.2 
 
The diagram represents all the agreements (the black points) that the groups made on the four issues. Each group is 
identified by a number which appears on the side of each agreement point. For each group four agreements on the four 
issues are depicted, respectively. The bold line from 4 to 18 on the abscissa represents the Zone of Agreement of the 
four issues.  
Results exp. 3 - Unanimity rule



























The results of experiment 3 basically reflect the results of experiments 1 and 2. Under the majority 
rule the great majority of the subjects has been subjected to the ZAB and chose a suboptimal 
solution (solution 1).  
Under the unanimity rule, notwithstanding the increased level of complexity of the negotiation 
problem (in comparison to experiment 2), the subjects have been induced to search for a solution 
outside the Zone of Agreement, and all of them have been able to find the Pareto-optimal solution 
(solution 2).  
For a synthesis of the results of experiment 3, and a comparison between the majority and the 
unanimity rule, see Fig.7.4.1 
 
 
 Fig.  7.4.1 
 
The (Pareto) optimal solution refers to both solutions 2 and 3, while the suboptimal solution refers 


















Suboptimal solution (Pareto) optimal
solution
Suboptimal solution
        Majority rule                                           Unanimity rule
Synthesis results exp. 3  27
8. Conclusions 
 
In the present study we have analysed the issue of coalition formation with a potential of logrolling 
under different voting rules in multi-issue multilateral negotiations. We have adopted the 
experimental method in order to gather empirical data on this topic which in the public choice 
literature so far has been treated only in a theoretical way.  
The aim of our experiment 1 has been to analyse to what extent negotiators are actually able (as 
would be predicted from the public choice theory) to form an optimal coalition and to reach an 
optimal agreement in a situation of a three-issue and three-parties negotiation with a potential for 
logrolling. In particular we tested the hypothesis that in certain situations the ZAB (Zone of 
Agreement Bias) might induce negotiators to form suboptimal coalitions which lead to Pareto-
dominated agreements, and that the cycling problem predicted by the public choice theory might 
not exist. 
The results of our first experiment have confirmed our initial hypothesis that a great majority of the 
subjects behaved in a way which is inconsistent with the public choice predictions, but consistent 
with the ZAB prediction. Most of the subjects adopted a satisficing behaviour; as soon as two 
negotiators out of three were able to find a suboptimal agreement within their Zone of Agreement 
on each issue separately, the search process for an optimal solution (outside the Zone of Agreement) 
was interrupted. Moreover, in almost all groups there arose no cycling problem. 
The aim of experiment 2 has been to examine the effects that different voting rules may have on the 
ZAB and on the optimality of the agreements. We considered the same negotiation problem as in 
experiment 1, and tested the hypothesis that the adoption of a unanimity rule, instead of a majority 
rule, might eliminate the effect of the ZAB. The results of experiment 2 have confirmed our initial 
hypothesis: under the unanimity rule the effect of the ZAB has been considerably lower. With the 
unanimity rule, however, the parties haven’t had the possibility to negotiate the three issues 
separately, because on each issue there was the veto of at least one party. This way most of the 
negotiators have been induced to explore the space of solutions falling outside the Zone of 
Agreement, and to find an optimal agreement. 
In experiment 3 we have tested whether the results obtained with experiments 1 and 2 even hold 
when the level of complexity of the negotiation problem increases. To this aim we considered the 
situation of four-issues and four parties negotiations under both the majority and the unanimity rule. 
The results of experiment 3 basically reflect the results of experiments 1 and 2. Under the majority 
rule the great majority of the subjects has been subject to the ZAB and chose a suboptimal solution. 
Under the unanimity rule, notwithstanding the increased level of complexity of the negotiation   28
problem, the subjects have been induced to search for a solution outside the Zone of Agreement, 
and all of them have been able to find the Pareto-optimal solution. 
As a consequence the results from our three experiments provide empirical data on multilateral 
negotiations which put into question the validity of some predictions of the public choice theory, 
and in particular of the perfect rationality assumption. We are, however, well aware of the fact that 
these results just hold for the specific situations (Figures 4.1.1 and 7.1.1) we took into 
consideration. An interesting line for future research could be to analyse the effects of a change in 
the utility curves, in the incentive structure, or in the negotiation modalities (simultaneous vs. 
sequential exchange of offers) of the negotiation task. Moreover it could be interesting to study the 
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Appendix A 
 




You are about to participate in an experimental study on decision-making and negotiation. The 
experiment will last about half an hour. The instructions of the experiment are simple, and if you 
follow them carefully, you may win an amount of money directly proportional to your performance 
in the experiment plus a show-up fee of 3 €.  
You will be randomly matched with 2 other participants, and your scope is to win as many points as 
you can. The amount of money you will be paid will be directly proportional to the total number of 
points you will score in the experiment. For each point you will get 0,25 €. At the beginning you 
will be assigned 15 points.  
 
What to do? 
 
Each participant will choose an envelope (A, B, or C) containing a record sheet and a sheet with 3 
tables. Please, write your name on the record sheet. 
Each of the three tables is made of two columns: in the left column you have a scale of numbers 
from 0 to 28. In the right column you have the number of points associated with each number in the 
left column. The tables of the other players are different from yours. Your tables and the points you 
get for each number of the left column is not known to the other player. Please, keep your tables 
secret. 
You have to negotiate with the other players in order to choose a number in the left column of each 
table, so as to maximize your own total number of points. For a number to be chosen it suffices that 
a majority of two players out of three agree on the number. Each player (the one excluded from the 
majority as well) will be assigned the points corresponding to the number chosen in each table. In 
case of disagreement each player will get 0 points The total number of points you will gain will be 
the sum of the points you get from the agreement in each table.  
You can negotiate following the order you prefer, i.e. you can start the negotiation with the any 
table, and you don’t have to conclude the negotiation on one table before switching to the next one. 
It is only important that you and the two other players negotiate on the same tables at the same time 
(for instance, you can all start negotiating on the second table)    30
During the negotiations you can speak freely with the other players (if you want, you can 
communicate information about your points) but you can not show them your tables. 
You have about 15 minutes to complete the negotiations on the three tables. 
 
* In experiment 2 the instructions were the same as in experiment 1, with the only difference that it 
was required that all negotiators agreed on one number in order for that number to be chosen. 
In experiment 3 the instructions for the majority and unanimity rule treatments were the same as in 
experiment 1 and 2 respectively, with the only difference that the groups were made of four 
negotiators and that decisions under the majority rule had to be taken with a majority of three out of 






Tables used in experiments 1 and 2 
 
The tables correspond to the utility curves depicted in Fig.4.1.1. Each player received the same 
three tables, but in a different order so that for player A issue 1 corresponded to Table 1, issue 2 to 
Table 2, and issue 3 to Table 3; for player B Table 2 corresponded to issue 1, Table 3 to issue 2, and 
Table 1 to issue 3; for player C Table 3 corresponded to issue 1, Table 1 to issue 2, and Table 2 to 
issue 3. 
In the experiment the numbers of the second issue have been inverted for each player, i.e. from 28 
to 0 instead of 0 to 28; this was done in order to prevent the subjects from realizing that they had the 
same utility functions.   31
 
TABLE 1    TABLE 2  TABLE 3 
Number Points   Number Points Number Points
0 14    0 -4  0 -16 
1 13    1  0  1 -15 
2 12    2  4  2 -15 
3 11    3  8  3 -14 
4 10    4 12  4 -13 
5 9    5  16  5  -12 
6 8    6  12  6  -12 
7 7    7 9  7  -11 
8 6    8 8  8  -10 
9 5    9 6  9 -9 
10 4    10 6  10 -9 
11 3    11 5  11 -8 
12 2    12 4  12 -7 
13 1    13 3  13 -6 
14 0    14 2  14 -6 
15 -1    15 2  15 -5 
16 -2    16 1  16 -4 
17 -3    17 1  17 -3 
18 -4    18 0  18 -3 
19 -5    19 -1  19 -2 
20 -6    20 -3  20 -1 
21 -7    21 -5  21 -1 
22 -8    22 -6  22 0 
23 -9    23 -7  23 3 
24 -9    24 -8  24 8 
25 -10    25  -8  25 13 
26 -10    26  -9  26 20 
27 -11    27  -9  27 34 
28 -11    28  -9  28 52 
Disagree  0   Disagree 0  Disagree  0 
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Appendix C 
 
Tables used in experiment 3 
 
The tables correspond to the utility curves depicted in Fig.7.1.1. Each player received the same four 
tables but in a different order, so that for player A issue 1 corresponded to Table 1, issue 2 to Table 
2, issue 3 to Table 3, and issue 4 to Table 4; for player B Table 2 corresponded to issue 1, Table 3 to 
issue 2, Table 4 to issue 3, and Table 1 to issue 4; for player C Table 3 corresponded to issue 1, 
Table 4 to issue 2, Table 1 to issue 3, and Table 2 to issue 4. 
In the experiment the numbers of the second and fourth issue have been inverted, i.e. from 28 to 0 
instead of 0 to 28; this was done in order to prevent the subjects from realizing that they had the 
same utility functions.   33
 
TABLE 1    TABLE 2    TABLE 3    TABLE 4 
Number Points    Number Points   Number Points   Number Points
0  32   0  -4  0  -16   0  -20 
1  26   1  1  1  -11   1  -20 
2  20   2  5  2  -7  2  -20 
3  16   3  8  3  -3  3  -20 
4  13   4  9  4  0  4  -20 
5  12   5  11   5  3  5  -19 
6  11   6  11   6  6  6  -19 
7  9  7  12   7  8  7  -19 
8  8  8  11   8  10   8  -19 
9  7  9  11   9  12   9  -19 
10  6    10 10    10 13    10 -18 
11 6    11 9    11  13    11  -18 
12 5    12 8    12  14    12  -18 
13 4    13 7    13  13    13  -18 
14 3    14 7    14  12    14  -17 
15 3    15 6    15  10    15  -17 
16 2    16 5    16 8    16  -17 
17 1    17 4    17 7    17  -17 
18 0    18 3    18 5    18  -16 
19 -1    19 1    19 3    19  -16 
20 -1    20 0    20 0    20  -16 
21 -2    21 -1    21 -2    21 -8 
22 -2    22 -1    22 -4    22 0 
23 -2    23 -2    23 -6    23 9 
24 -3    24 -3    24 -8    24 18 
25 -3    25 -4    25 -8    25 27 
26 -3    26 -4    26 -9    26 36 
27 -4    27 -5    27  -10    27 45 
28 -4    28 -5    28  -11    28 53 
Disagree  0   Disagree  0   Disagree 0   Disagree  0   34
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